Data Police episode 540: The herd and the immunity.
last update 20200515
This is a component of the ad hoc covid19 data project connected to the FUFF platform (fuff.org)
http://fuff.org/data/cr0.html
It includes a link to the model used below for the calculations
1 One concept that is currently being discussed scientifically and not so scientifically is the concept of community immunity, often referred to as 'herd immunity'.
2 I will only focus here on the very basic mathematical idea. Like the one you will find in the following Wikipedia article I will not go into how immunity is achieved and whether it is acceptable.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herd_immunity
3 However, I must at least mention some contextual aspects, as they are heavily interfering with all those mathematical concepts.
4 For example: Immunity might not be a truely binary state.
Or: Immunity might not be indefinite and this could mean that a wide range of length (time) of immunity is possible
(All this has not yet been researched for this virus).
5 And: All this will be different to some degree in different human beings and possibly for different mutation strains of the virus as well.
6 That means that in a not so simplified model calculation we are dealing with a lot of probability distributions. This in turn means we might speak of broad and flat confidence intervals (a very fuzzy result). And we might be carrying a high risk outside the confidence interval. There is a huge difference in risk if you have a gradually worse situation outside your confidence interval or a collapsing situation.
7 Also, I should at least mention that a part of the immunity may be represented in fatalities. While this does not affect an oversimplified abstract model (depends on the construction as well), it will make a difference in the real world because there will be some compensation for lost contacts (simple example: a hairdresser).
8 So what I will look at here is the mathematical concept I see in the public discussion: The very simplified idea of a homogenous 'herd' containing so many infected members that the reproduction rate sinks below 1 and reproduction fades out, because the infected member does not meet enough contacts that are still uninfected to further spread the virus.
9 The first thing that springs to mind is that the metaphor ('herd') does more bad than good. Like all metaphors it highlights and hides different properties of the metaphorized. But it does not mean equality.
A human population is no 'herd'.
10 When 'herds' are spoken of in the covid19 context it usually refers to the population of a country, or more precisely: to all people that are currently present in a geographical zone.
11 But those people are not a hegemonic group of equals crammed together in a stable, while still freely moving around inside and randomly meeting each other.
12 We are talking of a population consisting of regional clusters, organised in hub structures, with permeable borders between them. 
13 And then we are also talking of a population consisting of behavioural clusters, with gradually different behaviour within themselves, and again with permeable cluster boundaries. (the clusterization is a crutch) 
14 Those two facts alone ridicule any thumb rule for calculatiing 'herd immunity' from a R0.
Like the ones you find on the internet.
For example in the above mentioned Wikipedia article.
They are darts thrown at an imagined board hanging somewhere in the darkness.
15 The very first component that is neglected here is time. That was a serious threat when the pandemic began.
If you have a system where infection spreads from zero exponentially and the ratio of time needed for immunization to time needed for the exponential reproduction is the same as in the case of covid19, your immunity rate will remain pure theory. Before the necessary immunity level is reached, already 90% are infected. However that is just mathematics, and the calculation model is nearly as simplified as the common immunity calculation formula I just attacked. Like that formula, it does not take into account behavioural change, interventions etc.. And like that formula our population consists of a real 'herd', randomly meeting each other regardless of distance, all behaving the same, etc..
example is for a population of 80 million, R0=Rt=2.5, time to immunity 15 days
16 Now what if we assume that 50-60% are already immune and that the virus starts from scratch and that our population is a 'herd' like a cow herd or a sheep herd?
Here is what our simplifed distribution model spits out now:
At 50% (left chart) there is still a considerable crisis with close to 15 million new infections, at 60% (right chart) this dries down to only a few hundred 
You might think it is a contradiction, that a system that enters with 40 million infections produces a higher total than one that enters with 48 million.
It is not. A system without interventions would not have stopped at 50 million in the first place. See the example above.
 
17 So 60% is enough to stop further spread of infections in our HERD (60% immune, virus starting from scratch = 1 infection).
BUT ONLY if the outcome is average(!), ONLY if the group is homogenous, ONLY if mixing perfectly and randomly even of infected and non-infected (regardless of distance between them). And all behave the same (have the same job, travel the same, meet the same number of people, speak the same amount etc etc.).
So: Only in a scenario that is NEVER the case.
(In the same time the resulting outcome is very sensitive to the frame parameters, such as the number of days until immunity/isolation, the actual R0).
18 In reality now you will - instead - have clusters (or clumps) of uninfected persons, of which not all will have reached that necessary level of community immunity. Think of regional differences, think of (not so perfectly) sealed off groupings like nurse homes. 
19 Now we change the scenery: let's use a cluster model with an initial 60% immunity level overall, but that immunity is unevenly distributed across the clusters.
With a simple model of 4 equal sized clusters with 86%, 80%, 54%, and 20% immunity, we get a veritable crisis again within a few hundred days from 1 infection. More than 15 million additional infections instead of a few hundred, simply because the uneven distribution of the 60% immunity.
20 This seems to completely destroy any idea of a realistic immunity level below 90%.
BUT not so fast - the matter is complex (in fact it is even much more complex than I make it here).
21 The fact that we do not have a homogenous herd with an even distribution of contacts, can actually work in our favour, too. However you have to remember that this is not a linear process even we end up here with values that suggest this.
22 If now we add a behavioural cluster layer to the above example, in which we assume that it is more likely that a more active cluster is also more likely to have already reached a higher immunity level (not necessarily the case, so I mixed it a bit), the whole thing looks a bit more friendly.
Again, change of parameters have big effects, and eventually, more and more details are guessed at during the design process.
23 To fully understand the immunity concept let us recap something:
The 60% 50% 80%, whatever, they are immune.
The remaining 40% 50% or 20% however, they are not immune at all. Not one bit.
24 With a 'community immunity' we simply do not expect the average infection case to cause an epidemic, because we assume the Rt to stay below 1.  
25 But Rs are just averages of distributions and those distributions are asymmetrical and can have very long (or 'fat') tails, that may come into effect as a surprise. Think of the 'superspreaders' (an individual reproduction rate that lies far outside the expected spectrum). Calculated Rs can be deceptive, as there is always a value possible for the future that is far further outside the spectrum than anything you have had until now.
26 Nor are countries sealed off zones, and no country plans to never open its borders again or would be able to make them impermeable.
27 All this I do not find in the formulas proposed on the Internet, although I am confident they are accounted for in real experts models. 
28 So the proposed immunity levels are not very solid.
But that does not necessarily mean doom and gloom: Indeed we can have very positive effects by combining the reduction of Rt through behavioral change and the slowing of multiplication through partial immunity. It is just very complicated and is likely to be of greater benefit to certain clusters..
And slow does not mean the virus is less dangerous for the individual or less likely to mutate.
Here we have chosen the cluster parameters in such a way that the epidemic comes to a halt even before the infection level reaches 50%. Without intervention. But it is absolutely forbidden to take results like this as a serious calculation with all the guessing of parameters involved and ignorance of the parameters not involved
29 If you play around with our simple model, the redefinition of the included variables alone suggests such a dynamic change in the scenario that predicting the required level of immunity is very fragile and fuzzy. And the answer must be complex, taking into account all the above aspects.
30 Here we see many politicians embracing simple answers, preferring rules of thumb and traffic light variables to facilitate their political choices and offer apparent ways out of real dilemmas, which however do not disappear by being ignored.
They do not seem up to the task of challenging such a complex problem and manouver through a complex world. But even this is not proven, I guess.
Do you have anything to correct? add?
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